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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT
VS.

Case No.
13642

VERA MASON,
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a criminal prosecution
of the Defendant, here Appellant, for
theft during the course of which the
jury heard certain admissions from the
defendant on the stand relating to recent use of narcotics and testimony from
a police officer relative to the effect
of narcotics use.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Objections of Defense counsel
at the trial to testimony about narcotics use and alleged expert testimony as to effect of narcotics were
overruled by the trial court. The jury
found defendant quilty and she was
duly sentenced and is now serving her
term.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the
judgment, vacation of sentence and dismissal of the case as having been tried
under conditions so prejudicial as to
have resulted in denial of a fair trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The matter came on to be heard
in Third District Court in and for Salt
Lake County; the Honorable Joseph G.
Jeppson presiding. The State of Utah
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was represented by John R. Anderson,
Esq., and the Defendant by Jack W.
Kunkier, Esq., Salt Lake Legal Defenders
Association. Various witnesses testified
as to the circumstances surrounding a
theft, and made various identifications.
At the close of the State's case the
Defendant, Vera Mason, was called in
her own behalf and testified. After
direct testimony the State's attorney
began his cross-examination with the
question, "Mrs. Mason, are you now under
the influence of any narcotic?" Over
objection of Defense counsel the Defendant was directed to answer and replied
"Somewhat, yes." (P.. 110, T. 66) State's
next question was, "By <somewhat', would
you tell us when you last took a drug
and what it was?" Defendant replied,
"About, let's see, about 8:30 this
morning." (This testimony was given sometime after 3:00 p.m. as may be seen from
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the colloquy between court and bailiff
at page 50 of the Transcript (R 102)
about the time then being twenty to three.
A brief recess (R. 105 line 4) was had;
and testimony filling eight pages of
transcript was taken between "twenty
to three11 and the Defendant's testimony
about narcotics use.
Defendant subsequently testified
under cross examination as to the narcotic she had used, heroin (R. Ill,
line 2); the quantity, . two ten-dollar
caps or baloons (R. Ill, lines 13, 15);
her state of sensation, "Do you consider
yourself as now being under full control of your faculties?" "Yes."; "Are
you high?" Answer "No, I'm not." (R. Ill,
lines 18-22) .
An objection was sustained as to
when Defendant planned to take narcotics again, after which the following testimony occurred;
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q. (By Mr. Anderson, the prosecutor) "Your testimony, then, is that
you are now under the influence of the
heroin that you took at 8:30 this
morning?"
Mr. Kunkler: "I believe she just
testified that she wasn't."
Mr. Anderson: "She can answer it."
A. (Defendant) "I beg your pardon?51
Q."You are then under the influence of the two caps of heroin that
you took at 8:30 this morning?"
THE COURT:"You are now under
some influence from it?"
A. "Well somewhat. It's mostly
worn off. It's not - It's mostly gone
out. I'm not high or anything from the
effect of it."(R. Ill, 112 lines 27-30,
1-9). Thereafter followed cross-examination relating to defendant's whereabouts
on the date of the alleged theft.
David W. King, a police officer
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was subsequently recalled by the state
(R. 113), gave an account of his experience in narcotics related work
(R. 114); gave his opinion as to what
the effect of two balloons of heroin
would have on a "normal" person taken
at 8%30 in the morning "... the time
now being a quarter to four?" (Hospitalization) (R. 115); gave his opinion
as to the state of an addict under the
same time interval (wanting some more;
but neither extremely high nor in
pain from withdrawal) (R. 116). Under
cross-examination by defense counsel
officer King testified about cutting
of heroin and strengths (R, 117); kinds
of heroin, Mexico brown and French
white (R. 118), the kind and typical
strength of heroin available in Salt
Lake City (Mexico brown, "*.«typically
3 to 7 percent9') , (R. 118) , and gave an
opinion
thatW. an
Digitized by the Howard
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such a dose at 8:30 would not by that
time of day be "off in another world."
(R. 119) .
Defendant's admissions were
objected to and overruled by the court
three times. (R. 110, R. Ill) and the
testimony of the officer as expert
was objected to for lack of relevance,
and overruled (R. 114); for lack of
foundation (R. 114) (R. 115) and overruled in each case. The State did not
offer and the record does not disclose
any proffer of testimony which would
tend to show the truth of defendant's
admissions by independent evidence.
The court instructed the jury
as to the credibility and prejudicial
effect of the narcotics-use testimony
(Ro 119-121) but the jury instruction
on this point was oral and not submitted
to the jury in writing since the court
had not anticipated such testimony* (R. 119) .
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Defendant was found guilty as
charged.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
IT WAS ERROR TO PERMIT PROSECUTION TO ELICIT ADMISSION OF NARCOTICS
USE ON MORNING OF TRIAL FROM DEFENDANT
WITHOUT REQUIRING PROPER FOUNDATION
AND WITHOUT REQUIRING STATE TO PROVE OR
OFFER TO PROVE THAT MATTERS INSINUATED
OR SUGGESTED ON CROSS EXAMINATION WERE
TRUE BY INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE.
No Utah cases directly in point
have been found*.
Cases from other jurisdictions
are fairly numerous in holding that
narcotics addicts are not thereby
rendered incompetent as witnesses even
though addiction be proved.
There are a number of cases holding that evidence showing past ude of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

narcotics or effect of such may not
usually be shown for purposes of impeaching the credibility of witnesses.
People v Dixon, 22 111 2d 513, 177 NE2d
224, cert den 368 US 1003, 7 L ed 2d
542, 82 S Ct 637. People v Williams,
6 NY2d 18, 187 NYS2d 750, 159 NE2d
549, cert den 361 US 920, 4 L ed 188,
80 S Ct 266. People v Sorrentini, 26
App Div 2d 827, 273 NYS2d 981. Commonwealth v Davis (Pa Super) 132 A2d 408;
Commonwealth v Reginelli, 208 Pa Super
344, 222 A2d 605. Tobar v State, 32
Wis 2d 398, 145 NW2d 782.
There appears to be a well-recognized exception, however, where crossexamination is directed to determination of whether a given witness is
under the influence of narcotics while
testifying*

Campbell v U.S. (CAl

Mass) 269 F2d 688. State v Reyes, 99
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Ariz 257, 408 P2d 400.

People v Perez,

239 Cal App 2d 1, 48 Cal Rptr 596.
People v Lewis, 25 111 2d 396, 185 NE2d
168,

State v Cox (Mo) 352 SW2d 665.

State v Collins (Mo) 383 SW2d 747.
The inquiry is permitted for
purposes of showing lack of credibility.
People v. Perez, supra.
The Missouri courts have held that
the extent of cross-examination to
impeach credibility of a drug user is
a matter for the trial court's discretion. State v. Cox, supra.; State v.
Collins, supra.
Many older cases are summarized
at 52 ALR2d 848-860 in an annotation
"Use of drugs as affecting competency
or credibility of witness."
The earliest cases are reviewed
and analyzed in an article "The Testimony of Drug Addicts," George Rossman,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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3 Ore* L.Rev 81 (1924).
Utah Code Annotated 77-44-5 provides that a defendant may be crossexamined the same as any other witness
and his or her credibility may be impeached by the same methods.
A defendant or any other witness
may be temporarily incompetent to testifv
by reason of recent administration of
narcotics. But it is a matter for the
trial court's determination from personal observation whether the witness
is able to understand questions and
respond lucidly or whether he is temporarily so impaired as to lack the
qualifications of a witness.

State v.

Ballestros, 100 Ariz 262, 413 P2d 739.
People v Dixon, 22 111 2d 513, 177 NE2d
224, cert den 368 US 1003, 7 L ed 2d
542, 82 S Ct 637. State v Cox (Mo)
352 SW2d 665.
The better reasoned cases impose
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two requirements for the admissibility
of testimony about recent narcotics
use for purposes of impeachment of
credibility* They are 1) a foundation
must be laid and 2) the state must be
prepared to at least proffer proof of
either a history of addiction, some
physical evidence of use, e.g. needle
tracks, or independent proof of witnesses use of drugs.
The Appellate Court of Illinois has
said;
11

[2] It is an elementary rule
of trial procedure that for the
purpose of impeachment, a witness may be ctoss-examined concerning his drug addiction in
order to disclose a matter affecting his cridibility. (citing
Illinois cases)* However, a
foundation must be laid; and,
once this is done, it is incumbent on the party who lays
the foundation to offer proof
of what is insinuated or suggested in the impeaching
cross-examination. (Citations)
Failure to do so can, in a proper case, result in infringement of the right to a fair
trail.
Digitized
by the Howard(Citations)
W. Hunter Law Library, J.Therefore,
Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

it was improper for the
assistant state's attorney
to ask Urbina whether he
used narcotics without
being able to prove that
he was an addict or a user
of drugs. The trial judge
erred in allowing the
question and its answer to
be read to the jury. (Citations)."
People v. Telio, 1 111. App
3d 526, 275 NE2d 222 at 225.
The Court of Appeal for the
Second District, Division 2, in California has quoted 52 ALR2d 848-849
and added comment as follows:
"As stated in 52 A.L*R2d
at pages 848-849*- *The view
adhered to by what may be called
the weight of authority is
that testimpny as to narcotic
addictionf or expert testimony as to the effects of the
use of such drugs, is not considered admissible to impeach
the credibility of a witness
unless followed by testimony
tending to show that he was
under the influence while
testifyingt or when the events
to which he testified occurred,
or that his mental faculties
were actually impaired by the
habit. A minority of the decisions take the broad view
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that evidence of the use of narcotics (may be introduced subject
to) the qualifying factors mentioned above,* (See said A.L.R.
reference for a summarv of cases
supporting majority and minority
views; see also So.Calif.Law
Review, Vol. 16, page 333 et seq.
for a discussion of this issue
with appropriate citations of
cases.) Reason and California case
law compels the adoption of the
majority view. The prosecution
produced no witnesses nor made
any offer of proof to indicate
that Aiken was under the influence at any critical time or
that his mental faculties were
actually impaired by reason of
addiction. The whole line of
questioning on this subject was
not only improper but highly
prejudicial to appellant Ortega
and could only have the effect
of degrading the witness Aiken."
(Emphasis added). People v
Ortega, 2 col App3d 888 at
9W7^83 Cal.Reptr 260 at 271.
In the case at bar it does not
appear that anywhere in the record
did the State attempt to adduce or
even make a proffer of independent
proof of defendant's use of narcotics.
The entire matter of the
defendant-witnesses use of narcotics
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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depends on her own admission. An
admission elicited from her before
any foundation of any type had been
laid by the statess attorney.

An

admission made over counsel's objection -and never subsequently
corroborated by any independent evidence whatever.

In accordance with

the principles enunciated in the better
reasoned opinions, defendant respectfully submits that in this case, if
anywhere, have failure to lay a
foundation and to thereafter "offer
proof of the matters insinuated or
suggested in the impeaching crossexamination" resulted in infringement of the right to a fair trial,
POINT II
IT WAS ERROR TO PERMIT A POLICE
OFFICER WITH NARCOTICS SQUAD EXPERIENCE TO TESTIFY AS TO THE EFFECTS OF
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

NARCOTICS IN GENERAL TERMS AND WITHOUT
ANY PROBATIVE RELATIONSHIP TO THE
DEFENDANT-WITNESS" PRESENT CONDITION
AND WITHOUT ANY EVIDENCE WHATEVER BEFORE THE COURT OR JURY AS TO THE TYPE
OR STRENGTH OF NARCOTICS DEFENDANT
MIGHT HAVE USED.
In general terms the Utah rule
on expert witnesses is that the qualifications necessary for a witness to
testify as an expert depend on the
nature of the case and the complexity
of the particular matters on which he
will testify. Startin v. Madsen, 120
*

U 631,237 Pe2d 834. It is a matter for
the trial court to pass upon whether
the matter requires expert testimony
and if so what the necessary qualifications of the witness shall be, Webb
Vo Qlin Mathieson Chemical Corp.,
(9 U2d 275, 342 P2d 1094, 30 i\LR2d 475).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It is also the responsibility of the

court to closely scrutinize the
qualifications of the expert witness,
in view of the weight and significance
to be given his testimony, in order
to guard against giving undue credence
to the pseudo-expert of charlatan. Id.
In the present case the officer
testified to two and a half years of
police work in narcotics. He testified
to having been to narcotics seminars,
the Utah Police Academy narcotics
investigation course, working a year
undercover and stated that "experience"
had been his greatest teacher. (R 114,
T. 70). Immediately following that
testimony he testified that he could
not state with any degree of precision
how much heroin was in a cap, "not in
milligrams or anything" (R. 115, T. 71);
that it would amount to something
like half a cold capsule full, that it
would be cut ®with lactose or something
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

like that" and that two balloons worth
would hospitalize a "normal" (i.e.
non-addicted) person. (R. 115; T. 71)
He further testified on direct examination that an addict would be neither
extremely high nor in pain of withdrawal on two caps taken at 8:30 that
same morning by the time he was testifying, 3:45 p.m. (R 116, T. 72, line 10,11-19)
He had previously testified that the
mental state in which a heroin user
would be, in his opinion, would depend
on "....what habit the heroin user had,
how much heroin he shows (sic), how
much resistance he has, how long he or
she had been on heroin." (R. 116,
T. 72, lines 3-5).
On cross-examination the officer
testified as to the probable condition
of an addict who might be accustomed
to taking two caps at 8:30 in the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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morning of "current street heroin";

(R. 117, T. 73); admitted that heroin
may be "cut" many times by dealer,
pusher (Id.); that strengths of cuts
vary; that at least two kinds of
heroin are available varying greatly
in quality (R 118, T. 74, lines 17-26).
The foregoing is all the testimony that was offered on the subject
of heroin and its effects. As to the
defendant-witness who had previously
assumed the stand in her own behalf,
something she was not bound to do,
this testimony without more served
only to inflame the jury and to offer
them nebulous criteria for impermissible
speculation as to what the effects of
a heroin use by the defendant early
in the day of the trial might have been.
There is no scintilla of evidence
anywhere that the defendant in fact
used any narcotic apart from her own
admission extracted over her counsel's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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made no showing that the balloons
in this case contained heroin at all,
that if they did it was of any particular type or grade, or that it was cut
to a heavy or mild or non-narcotic
dose by percentage.

The jury could

only conjecture from the paucity of
proof and wealth of innuendo presented
in officer King's testimony.
Officer King's testimony is
highly suspect as expert opinion evidence* He claims no medical background,
describes no physical symptoms*

He is

only able to state that experience has
4

taught him a good deal and that he has
seen people in drugs. Nowhere in the
record does it appear that he can
characterize the defendant as appearing as though under the influence of
narcotics.

Rather the officer?s testi-

mony is a series of conjectures as to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

how much or how little an addict might
be "hurting" after an elapsed time of
7 1/4 hours since a fix consisting
of two caps of un unknown grade of an
unknown variety of a substance identified only by the defendant over objection
as heroin•
Here as in Ortega

(supra) "the

whole line of questioning on this
subject was not only improper but
highly prejudicial to appellant ...
and could only have the effect of
degrading the witness", here the defendant .
The degradation of the witness
in the jury5s eyes can readily be
seenf when such evidence come in, is
hashed and rehashed immediately before
their deliberations, yet never tried
by any shred of independent corroborative evidence to defendants condition
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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at the time of trial, or to her past
history of addiction, tolerance,
quality of use or any other of the
factors which the state's own pseudoexpert witness himself testified
would have to be factors to be considered in forming an opinion as to
the defendants present state of mind.
CONCLUSION
Defendant, as a matter of law,
is entitled to dismissal of the verdict
against her and the vacation of
sentences pursuant thereto because
of prejudicial error in permitting
the State's attorney to elicit damaging
admissions relative to recent use of
narcotics without first laying a foundation and/or subsequently adducing
or at least proffering independent
corroborative evidence of defendant's
2?
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alleged use; and because the state's
expert witness 1) lacked the necessary
expertise to testify meaningfully
as to the effects of narcotics on the
defendant and 2) what testimony he gave
was never related to defendant, consisted
of hypothetical narcotics effects
based on generalities not meeting
the standard of proof and had only the
effect yjf prejudicing the jury against
defendant since it was without probative value as to the effects of admitted
drug use by her.
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